Kevan Francis v. The State of Utah : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2009
Kevan Francis v. The State of Utah : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Peggy E. Stone; assistant attorney general; attorney for appellees.
Allen K. Young; Young, Kester and Petro; Jonah Orlosfsky; attorneys for appellants.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Francis v. Utah, No. 20090256 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1577
IN THE UTAH SI TRI \U < 
KEVAN FRANCIS, et al., 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
THFST'Vl'FOI III Ml M ,il. 
Defendants-Appellees. 
Ul PLY BRIEF OF 
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS 
>6 
oral argumeni requested 
Anneal lion. n.. . .vi^ menl ol the 1-ouiili .i...v..v..»• -•isirK.i * ourt, 
:
 "ih Countv 
The' ...!;... ;. ,ai\ -it. District L,v.;a u ,.e. Pn •  L. 
i): trict Court Case No. 08040 S','2', 
Peggy E. Stone 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
P.O. Box 140856 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Attorney for Defendants-Appellees 
Allen K. Young 
YOUNG KESTER& IM.IRn 
75 South 300 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Jonah Ori.>I si.. 
LAW OFFICI.S OF JONATT ORT OFSKY 
122 South Michigan Ave.. Suite IX-!' 
Chic;i?o "'iV :':W-"< 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
OCi 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
KEVAN FRANCIS, et al., 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, et al., 
Defendants-Appellees. 
REPLY BRIEF OF 
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS 
No. 20090256 
Oral argument requested 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Fourth Judicial District Court, 
Utah County 
The Honorable Gary D. Stott, District Court Judge, Presiding 
District Court Case No. 080401029 
Peggy E. Stone 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
P.O. Box 140856 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Attorney for Defendants-Appellees 
Allen K. Young 
YOUNG KESTER & PETRO 
75 South 300 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Jonah Orlofsky 
LAW OFFICES OF JONAH ORLOFSKY 
122 South Michigan Ave., Suite 1850 
Chicago, Illinois 60603 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
INTRODUCTION 1 
ARGUMENT 1 
Preliminary Note On The State's Regulation 1 
I. The State Owed Plaintiffs And Their Son A Duty Of Care 2 
II. The Permit Exception Does Not Apply 5 
A. No "Permit" or "Order" was Involved 5 
1. There was no failure to issue an "order" 5 
2. There was no "authorization" to revoke 8 
B. Even If The Permit Exception Applied, It Would Not Bar 
Plaintiffs' Alternative To Warn Claim 11 
C. The Permit Exception Should Not Apply to Federal Conduct 13 
III. The Natural Condition Exception Does Not Apply 13 
CONCLUSION 16 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 17 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Apffelv. Huddleston, 50 F.Supp.2d 1129, 1141 (D.Utah 1999) 16 
Benjamin v. AMIGA Mut. Ins. Co., 140 P.3d 1210 (Utah 2006) 12 
Blackner v. Dept. of Transportation, 48 P.3d 949 (Utah 2002) 15, 16 
Bucknerv. Kennard, 99 P.3d 842, 851 (Utah 2004) 5 
Carlson v. Alaska, 598 P.2d 969, 974 (Alaska 1979) 4 
Dayv. State, 980 P. 2d 1171 (Utah 1999) 2 
Slisze v. Stanley-Bostitch, 979 P.2d 317, 321 (Utah 1999) 2 
Gaddv. United States, 971 F.Supp. 502 (D.Utah 1997) 4 
Grappendorfv. Pleasant Grove City, 173 P.3d 166, 170 (Utah 2007) 14, 16 
Metropolitan Fin. Co. v. State, 714, P.2d293 (Utah 1986) 11 
State v. Reams, 153 P.3d 731, 735-36 (Utah App. 2006) 9 
Stuckman ex rel. Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568 (Utah 1996).... 14, 15, & 16 
Taylor v. Ogden Sch. Dist, 927 P.2d 159 (Utah 1996) 12 
Webb v. University of Utah, 125 P.3d 906 (Utah 2005) 2, 3 
STATUTES 
36 C.F.R. § 261.50(a) 5, 7 
36 C.F.R. §261.17 8 
Utah Code Ann. §17-21-18.5 9 
Utah Code Ann. §26-2-5 10 
ii 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-203(l) 11 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(11) 13 
Utah County Code § 12-8-2-(c) 10 
i i i 
INTRODUCTION 
Two important points emerge from the State's Brief. First, the State has largely 
abandoned the District Court's decision. Two of the State's three arguments on appeal -
the lack of a duty - and the "natural causes" exception to the Immunity Act - are, by the 
State's own admission, entirely new arguments presented for the first time on appeal. 
Second, the State does not dispute, for the purposes of this appeal, the District 
Court's statement that the State "did not follow [its] internal regulation." This is not a 
case, therefore, where the State's failed to protect the public from a general risk of 
wildlife attack. Rather, the State enacted a specific regulation setting out what was 
required in this kind of situation, and it failed to follow its own standard of care. 
ARGUMENT 
Preliminary Note On The State's Regulation 
The State suggests that the black bear incident regulation quoted in the District 
Court's Opinion is "not part of the record." (State Br. at 13, n.3) The entire regulation 
was handed to the District Court judge during oral argument (ROOOl 12), but never made 
an exhibit. The entire regulation, therefore, is not formally part of the record, but the 
relevant portions were read into the record in open court (ROOOl 12), and the portion most 
relevant to the issues on appeal was quoted by the District Court in its Opinion. (Op. at 
Add. 7-8) All of the relevant portions of the regulation, therefore, are part of the record. 
L The State Owed Plaintiffs And Their Son A Duty Of Care 
In Webb v. University of Utah, 125 P.3d 906 (Utah 2005), the Court thoroughly 
analyzed the question of when the State owes a duty to a citizen sufficient to support a 
tort claim. The Court held that there must be a "special relationship" between the State 
and the plaintiff that goes beyond the duty the government owes to the public at large. 
Then, citing its prior decision in Day v. State, 980 P. 2d 1171 (Utah 1999), the Court held 
that a special relationship can be established in at least four circumstances (Id. at 912): 
A special relationship can be established (1) by a statute intended to protect 
a specific class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member from a 
particular type of harm; (2) when a government agent undertakes specific 
action to protect a person or property; (3) by governmental actions that 
reasonably induce detrimental reliance by a member of the public; and (4) 
under certain circumstances, when the agency has actual custody of the 
plaintiff or of a third person who causes harm to the plaintiff. 
The first two circumstances are present here. With respect to the first, the State's 
internal regulation required it to clear the campsite of attractants - campers are attractants 
- until the bear had been dealt with. This regulation, therefore, was intended to protect a 
specific class of persons - individuals seeking to use the campsite in the period between 
the first attack and the time the bear was destroyed - from a particular type of harm - an 
attack by a Level III bear. Although the Webb decision refers to statutes intended to 
protect specific people, the courts traditionally afford regulations the same impact as 
statutes in determining tort duties. E.g., Slisze v. Stanley-Bostitch, 979 P.2d 317, 321 
(Utah 1999) ("In determining the appropriate standard of conduct, the Restatement 
permits courts to adopt the standard from a legislative enactment or an administrative 
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regulation"). The State's internal regulation, therefore, created the necessary special 
relationship between the State and Plaintiffs. 
The second listed circumstance is also applicable, because the State undertook 
specific action to protect people who might seek to use the campsite. It is undisputed the 
State attempted to track and kill the bear. The State also admitted in its Answer that it 
checked on the campsite in question when terminating the search. (R000029) While the 
State failed to post a notice for those who might arrive later, there can be no denying that 
the State undertook specific actions to protect campers at that campsite. 
The facts pled in the Complaint, therefore, establish the necessary special 
relationship under two of the four circumstances stated in Webb. This would be a 
different situation were Plaintiffs contending that the State did not do enough to protect 
the public from bears in general. Such a claim might lack the necessary special 
relationship. Here, however, the essence of the claim is that the State had a specific 
regulation that it failed to comply with, and that the State undertook actions intended to 
protect the specific individuals who might use the campsite. 
All of the allegedly contrary authority cited by the State is not on point. The State 
first cites authority for the propositions that the owner of a land is not liable for harm 
done by wild animals (State Br. at 9), and that the State's statutory ownership of wildlife 
creates no duty. (State Br. at 10). These principles, however, are irrelevant, because 
Plaintiffs are not asserting a duty based on landownership or statutory ownership of 
wildlife. The State's duty arises out of the fact that the State undertook, through its 
regulation, the joint responsibility with the federal government specifically to manage 
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problem black bears: "By memorandum of understanding, the Division and the Wildlife 
Services have agreed to share the responsibility for handling nuisance and depredating 
black bear incidents...." (R000112) 
Next, the State cites several cases for the proposition that governments are not 
liable for a failure to control wildlife. (State Br. at 11) These cases, however, involve the 
general risk of wildlife, which is not the situation here. For example, in the case the State 
considers the most factually similar, Gaddv. United States, 971 F.Supp. 502 (D.Utah 
1997), a camper was severely injured by a bear attack in a U.S. Forest. The Plaintiff 
alleged that the injury was due to negligence in the government's general management of 
that national forest. There had been no prior attacks in the area, nor was there any reason 
to suspect such an attack, apart from the generalized risks that bears present. The court 
ruled that the federal government was immune form suit, but carefully noted that there 
had been no danger associated with the site of the attack: 
Therefore, where a hazard such as bears, is not a known natural hazard 
directly associated with a particular site, the decision whether to post 
warning signs would be discretionary. Id. at 508; emphasis added. 
In contrast to the cases cited by the State, the Alaskan Supreme Court reviewed 
the relevant case law on state liability for animal attacks and concluded: 
The few cases that have considered similar facts, however, appear to agree 
that, if a landowner knows that a wild animal is creating a dangerous 
situation on his property, he has a duty either to remove the danger or to 
warn the people who may be threatened by the danger. 
Carlson v. Alaska, 598 P.2d 969, 974 (Alaska 1979). 
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II. The Permit Exception Does Not Apply 
A. No "Permit" or "Order" was Involved 
The State vacillates between arguing that Section 301(5)(c) is triggered because 
this claim involves a failure by the federal government to issue an "order" closing the 
campground, or alternatively, the claim involves the failure to revoke an "authorization" 
to use the campground. We will separately examine these two arguments. For either 
argument, the State bears the burden of proof, because governmental immunity is an 
affirmative defense. Buckner v. Kennard, 99 P.3d 842, 851 (Utah 2004). 
1. There was no failure to issue an "order." 
The State argues that for the federal government to close the campsite while the 
bear was being hunted, it would have had to issue a "formal closure order" under 36 
C.F.R. § 261.50(a). (State Brief at 20) The Complaint, however, does not allege that the 
Forest Service would or should have issued such an order. Consequently, the State bases 
its argument on the following federal regulation, which empowers U.S. Forest Service 
officials to issue formal written orders closing or restricting access to federal land: 
The Chief, each Regional Forester, each Experiment Station Director, the 
Administrator of the Lake Tahoe Basin Management Unit and each Forest 
Supervisor may issue orders which close or restrict the use of described 
areas within the area over which he has jurisdiction. An order may close an 
area to entry or may restrict the use of an area by applying any or all of the 
prohibitions authorized in this subpart or any portion thereof. (36 C.F.R. § 
261.50(a)) 
As a threshold matter, the State bears the burden of proof that the "order" 
provision of the Act applies, and the citation of this section does not satisfy that burden. 
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The fact that the federal officials have the power to issue written orders does not prove 
that an order was required or appropriate in this situation. 
More fundamentally, the cited federal regulation concerns the issuance of formal, 
written orders for long-term policies concerning an area of federal land. The orders 
contemplated by this section are not appropriate for the kind of immediate steps that were 
necessary to quickly ensure no campers used the campsite in question until the bear had 
been eliminated. In these kinds of situations, campers need quick notice of the danger, 
and the need to stay away from the campsite will not likely last more than a day or two, 
until the bear is located and dealt with. 
The inapplicability of the formal written orders contemplated by this regulation 
can be seen by looking at the procedures involved in issuing such an order (261.50(c)): 
(c) Each order shall: 
(1) For orders issued under paragraph (a) of this section, describe the area 
to which the order applies; 
(2) For orders issued under paragraph (b) of this section, describe the road 
or trail to which the order applies; 
(3) Specify the times during which the prohibitions apply if applied only 
during limited times; 
(4) State each prohibition which is applied; and 
(5) Be posted in accordance with Sec. 261.51. 
The last section requires posting in accordance with Sec. 261.51, which provides: 
Posting is accomplished by: 
(a) Placing a copy of the order imposing each prohibition in the offices of 
the Forest Supervisor and District Ranger, or equivalent officer who have 
jurisdiction over the lands affected by the order, and 
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(b) Displaying each prohibition imposed by an order in such locations and 
manner as to reasonably bring the prohibition to the attention of the public. 
The bureaucratic machinery contemplated by this Section has no application to a 
situation such as the presence of Level III bear, anymore than it would the danger 
presented by the escape of a violent criminal or a traffic accident. By the time the Forest 
Service would have drafted a written order and posted it in compliance with the 
requirements of these provisions, the bear could have killed multiple campers.1 
The State's argument that a formal order was required illustrates the State's 
attempt to over expand the language of Section 301(5)(c) of the Immunity Act. As 
Plaintiffs demonstrated in their initial Brief, the language "permit, license, certificate, 
approval, order or similar authorization" refers to instances in which the government is 
given the authority to make a deliberative decision as to who gets to undertake a 
regulated activity, based on statutory or administrative criterion. The kind of deliberative 
process, which results in the issuance of a formal, written order, does not apply to the 
facts of this case, which is nothing more than a brief closure of a campsite while a 
particular danger was being eliminated. This has nothing to do with the kind of process 
the government must go through in deciding whether to issue a license, permit or similar 
authorization. 
1
 Plaintiffs provided the District Court an example (R 00052) of an "order" issued by the 
federal Forest Service for the Uinta National Forest pursuant to 36 C.F.R. 261.50(a). The 
order closes a number of trails for an indefinite period of time until the completion of a 
construction project that will set a new waterline in Slate Canyon. The Order was duly 
published on May 30, 2006, and posted in the required manner. 
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2. There was no "authorization" to revoke. 
The State next argues that: 
"Once the public pays the entrance fee, the federal government gives its 
authorization, albeit implicit, to stay in the area and hike, picnic, or camp. 
That authorization is sufficient to fall within the permit exception. (State's 
Br. at 20) 
There are multiple problems with this argument. First, there is no evidence in the 
record that Plaintiffs paid a fee to use the campsite. The State cites a provision of the 
Code of Federal Regulations, 36 C.F.R. §261.17 (incorrectly cited as "§ 261.15"), which 
makes is unlawful to fail to pay a required fee. (State Br. at 20) That, however, does not 
establish that an entrance fee was paid or required. Indeed, the only relevant evidence in 
the record is the State's admission that the campsite in question was an "unimproved" 
campsite (00030), which suggests no fee was paid to use that campsite. 
The more fundamental problem with this argument, however, is that payment of 
an entrance fee (if one was paid) would not constitute a license, permit or similar 
authorization under Section 301(5)(c). The Act does not contain an exception to the 
waiver of immunity for claims arising out of situations in which the government charges 
a fee, and charging a fee is not the same as issuing a permit, license or similar kind of 
authorization. The State is attempting to add a new category that is not in the Act. 
A fee is collected when the State decides to charge for an activity. A fee can be 
charged in conjunction with issuing a permit, license, or authorization, but it can also be 
charged in situations where there is no permit, license or similar authorization required. 
The case was dismissed pursuant to the State's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, 
so the payment of a fee would have to appear in the Complaint or Answer. 
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County recorders can charge a fee for providing copies of documents. Utah Code Ann. 
§17-21-18.5. The Utah Code broadly allows counties to charge fees for services 
provided by various county officers. State v. Kearns, 153 P.3d 731, 735-36 (Utah App. 
2006). In these situations, there is no permit, license or similar authorization involved; 
the government is simply charging a fee for providing a service. 
The assumption underlying the State's argument is that if you pay a fee for an 
activity, you have been implicitly "authorized" to undertake that activity/ There is no 
basis for this assumption. Paying a fee is paying a required charge; it does not involve 
the government deciding whether you qualify to undertake an activity. 
The State's proposed interpretation of the term "authorization" ignores the fact 
that the Act provides immunity for claims arising out of the issuance or failure to revoke 
any "permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization." (§301(5)(c); 
emphasis added.) The Act does not apply to anything that might colloquially be referred 
to as an authorization, but only authorizations that are similar to the issuance of a permit, 
license, certificate, approval, or order. 
As Plaintiffs showed in their initial brief, the unifying trait in these terms is that 
they refer to situations where the State must make a determination as to whether an 
individual qualifies to undertake a regulated activity. Since the State makes no claim 
here that any decision was made that Plaintiffs qualified to camp at the campsite in 
question, there is no basis for applying Section 301(5)(c). 
3
 "Once the public pays the entrance fee, the federal government gives its authorization, 
albeit implicit, to stay in the area and hike, picnic, or camp." (State Br. at 20; emphasis 
added) 
9 
The State tries to argue that the terms permit, license, certificate, approval and 
order are not limited to such situations, but its examples do not support its argument. The 
State's first example is a fishing license. While fishing licenses have very few 
requirements, there are age and residence requirements for the various kinds of fishing 
licenses, http://wildlife.iitah.gov/licenses/license_fees.php. However minimal, the State 
is not merely charging a fee, but determining whether you qualify for the particular 
license you choose to purchase. 
The State next points out that for birth certificates, one does not have to "qualify" 
to be born. The purpose of a birth certificate, however, is the creation of a record that 
certifies the true facts relating to a birth, and, as the State concedes, a birth certificate will 
not be issued unless it meets a very long list of requirements. Utah Code Ann. §26-2-5. 
Thus, the State does, in fact, determine what qualifies as a valid birth certificate, pursuant 
to a long list of qualifications. 
The State then points to the permits issued by Utah County for an event, such as a 
race, that requires the use of a county road. While the State claims that no qualifications 
except payment of a fee are required (State Br. at 21), this is incorrect. The County 
ordinance provides that: "Prior to issuance of the event permit, the application shall be 
approved by the Utah County Public Works Department, the Utah County Sheriffs 
Office, and the Utah County Attorney's Office as necessary." Utah County Code § 12-8-
2-(c). Thus, contrary to what the State suggests, one has to run a gauntlet of approval 
before obtaining such a permit. 
10 
Finally, the State claims that this Court examined a certificate that is issued 
without the need to meet any qualifications. The case is Metropolitan Fin. Co. v. State, 
714, P.2d 293 (Utah 1986), and the certificate that is purportedly issued without looking 
at qualifications is a certificate of title for an automobile. In fact, the relevant section of 
the Utah code lists a host of qualifications that the owner must meet before a car can be 
properly registered. Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-203(l). The certificate of title at issue in 
Metropolitan Fin. Co. is a document whereby the State certifies that a car is duly 
registered to a particular individual, and it can only be issued if the State has found that a 
person meets all the qualifications to register an automobile. 
The State's "examples," therefore, confirm that permits, certificates, licenses 
orders and approvals involve situations in which the State has to determine whether 
someone meets the qualifications to undertake a regulated activity. The term 
"authorization" only applies to approvals by the State that, while not called certificates, 
orders, licenses, permits or approvals, are functionally the same. Consequently, even if a 
fee was collected from Plaintiffs to use the campsite, there was no act that would 
constitute an "authorization" under Section 301(5)(c). 
B. Even If The Permit Exception Applied, It Would 
Not Bar Plaintiffs1 Alternative Failure To Warn Claim. 
If the Court were to find, contrary to the argument just made, that closing the 
campsite would have involved the issuance of an "order," or the revoking of an 
"authorization," that ruling should not apply to the alternative claim that the State is 
liable for its failure to warn Plaintiffs of the known danger at the campsite. 
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The State does not dispute that, standing on its own, a claim based on a failure to 
warn would not be subject to Section 301(5)(c). The State's position is that having pled 
one theory of liability that is subject to immunity, all other alternative theories of liability 
for that incident are barred by the Statute. Alternative pleading, according to the State, is 
not permitted under the Act. There is, however, neither logic nor legal authority 
supporting the notion that the "arising out o f language in §301(5) precludes alternative 
pleading. As Plaintiffs pointed out in their initial brief: 
Utah law specifically permits alternative pleading, even if one theory 
contradicts the other. For example, in Benjamin v. AMICA Mut. Ins. Co., 
140 P.3d 1210 (Utah 2006), the plaintiff pled a cause of action for both 
negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court, citing 
Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a), held that even though the crux of a claim for negligent 
infliction of emotion distress was unintentional action, plaintiff could plead 
both that and a claim that the conduct was intentional. Id. at 1214. Here, 
Plaintiffs have pled alternative theories, one that the State was negligent for 
failing to secure the closure of the campground, and the other for failing to 
warn potential campers. 
The State has offered no response to this argument. Furthermore, the only case 
cited, Taylor v. Ogden Sck Dist, 927 P.2d 159 (Utah 1996), did not involve alternative 
and independent theories of liability. In Taylor, plaintiff was involved in a fight (an 
assault) in a school, and his injuries were exacerbated by the fact that he crashed into a 
window. Since claims arising out of an assault are immune, plaintiff tried to fashion a 
non-immune claim by focusing on the fact that the State was negligent for not using safer 
glass in its windows. Plaintiff could not avoid, however, the fundamental fact that the 
injury was caused solely by the fight, and thus arose exclusively out of an immune 
category. The claim, therefore, arose out of an immune event,- and plaintiff could not 
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allege a theory of liability that was independent of that immune event. Here, in contrast, 
the theory of liability based on the failure to warn is a complete and independent theory 
of liability that is not tied in any way to the failure to close the campsite. 
Utah has long permitted the pleading of alternative theories of liability, even if the 
facts of the alternative theories are contradictory. There is no basis for interpreting the 
"arising out o f language as overriding this basic rule of pleading. 
C. The Permit Exception Should Not Apply To Federal Conduct 
Plaintiffs argued in their opening Brief that Section 301(5)(c) should not apply 
because the entity that allegedly would have issued an "order" or revoked an 
"authorization" was the federal government, and Section 301(5)(c) should apply on to 
Utah's failure to issue an order or revoke an authorization. The State has not offered any 
justification for applying the exception to situations arising out of actions by the federal 
government, other states, or even other countries. 
III. The Natural Condition Exception Does Not Apply 
For the first time on appeal, the State argues that Section 301(5)(k)4 provides 
immunity, because it creates an exception for claims that arise out of: 
(k) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands; 
This provision does not apply because the State enacted a policy designed to 
protect the public from dangerous bears, and this case arises out of the State's failure to 
properly implement its own policy. This Court previously dealt with a conceptually 
4
 This provision is generally referred to in case law by its prior number, Utah Code Ann 
§63-30-10(11). 
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identical claim in Stuckman ex rel Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568 (Utah 1996), 
and rejected a claim of immunity under Section 301(5)(k). In Nelson, a young child was 
playing in a park near the Jordon River. The mother believed it was safe for the child 
because the State had erected a fence between the park and the river. The child found its 
way to the river and drowned, allegedly because there was a breach in the fence. The 
Plaintiff sued, alleging, much like here, both a failure to warn of a dangerous condition, 
and a failure to take adequate protective measures. Id. at 570-72. The State argued that 
is was immune because the river was a natural condition under Section 301(5)(k). While 
the Court agreed that the river was a natural condition, it held that 301(5)(k) did not apply 
(Id. at 575): 
By constructing the fence that separates Riverside Park from the Jordan 
River Parkway, the City of State undertook to provide protection. Having 
done so, the responsible party is obligated to exercise reasonable care in 
maintaining the fence, [citation omitted] Failure to do so could give rise to 
liability on the part of the responsible party. 
The Court reaffirmed this holding in its most recent ruling on the natural 
conditions clause of the Act, Grappendorfv. Pleasant Grove City, 173 P.3d 166, 170 
(Utah 2007): 
Similarly, in Stuckman ex rel Nelson, we recognized that a river was a 
natural condition, but ultimately held that the city was not immune from 
suit because it undertook a duty to protect citizens from the river by 
building a fence. 
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The same concept is applicable here. Assuming a bear is a natural condition,5 the 
State undertook a duty to protect citizens from a Level III bear by enacting a policy, and 
there is no reason why the policy at issue here is any different than the fence the State 
built in Nelson. In both cases, the claim no longer arises out of the natural condition, but 
rather out of the State's failure to fulfill a duty it undertook to protect citizens from a 
particular danger. 
The Nelson decision recognized that § 301(5)(k) is important because: 
The State and other governmental entities cannot be expected to erect a 
fence around every waterway or potentially hazardous condition located on 
public property. 
919 P.2d at 575. The critical fact that eliminated the application of §301(5)(c) was that 
the State had undertaken steps to protect the public from a specific danger. Id. 
This fact distinguishes the State's primary authority, Blackner v. Dept of 
Transportation, 48 P.3d 949 (Utah 2002), a case involving motorists who were injured in 
second avalanche when State officials were on the scene attempting to clear a road after 
the initial avalanche. In Blackner, there was no fence, or policy, or any allegation that the 
State had undertaken no steps to protect motorists in such a situation, or that the State had 
failed to follow its own policies or procedures. Rather, the allegation was that State 
officials, who were on the scene because of the first avalanche, were negligent in not 
protecting the motorists from a second avalanche. The Court did not cite Nelson in 
Blackner, no doubt because there was no basis for applying that decision. Furthermore, 
5
 No court of this State has yet decided whether wildlife constitutes a "natural condition 
on the land." 
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as noted above, this Court reaffirmed the Nelson holding, subsequent to Blackner, in 
Grappendorf 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated in this brief and their opening brief, Plaintiffs-Appellants 
respectfully request that the Court reverse the District Court's ruling granting 
Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and remand this case for further 
proceedings. 
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Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Allen K. Young 
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO 
75 South 300 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
801-379-0700 
Jonah Orlofsky 
LAW OFFICES OF JONAH ORLOFSKY 
122 South Michigan Ave., Suite 1850 
Chicago, Illinois 60603 
312-566-0455 
6
 This Nelson approach is implicit in a federal district court case addressing the 
applicability of the State Act to a claim based on a college student who fell while 
climbing cliffs on a student trip, Apffel v. Huddleston, 50 F.Supp.2d 1129, 1141 (D.Utah 
1999). The Court held that Section 301(5)(k) applied because "the court has already 
concluded that the dangerous condition which resulted in the death of Jason Apffel was 
the naturally occurring sandstone cliffs, rather than the act of planning a party in their 
vicinity...." (emphasis added) 
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